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Okay. So if you could start with your name and your title and your institution.

Sure. So my name is **Ruben Kline**. Uh, I'm an **associate professor, uh, uh, political science and director of the center for behavioral political economy at Stony Brook university**. And congratulations on getting tenure. Thank you. Yes, that is graded, one of the greatest achievements of my life.

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Probably the rest is all downhill from here. I guess that's what I said about, you know, having Behavioral Grooves and there we are. So two years later, Ruben, you are going to be presenting at the, uh, at the conference here. But what are you, what do you, you presenting a paper that you guys have. So tell us a little bit about that and tell us a little bit what the research behind it.

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Right. So, um, so the basic, uh, research we're presenting, so I was a little bit surprised. I'm delighted to be here and also a little bit surprised given that, um, this conference on norms and this research is much less directly related to norms than much of the research that's being presented here. Uh, but so basically the basic idea is, uh, this idea of, of choice overload. So this is mostly been studied in the sort of consumer context that, uh, this sort of counter intuitive idea **that giving people more choices actually might make them worse off**. Right?

Which is sort of isn't possible under sort of neoclassical economics, right?

The more choices can't make you worse off. Um, and, uh, so again, most of that has been done. The consumer setting we're interested in, most of my research is about climate change mitigation, although typically I study sort of cooperation and climate change mitigation and kind of strategic things related to that.

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But, uh, we are interested in **climate change mitigation and weather telling people that there's a lot of different ways they can help save the earth, which sounds like a good thing, might actually make them less likely to do so**. Uh, that was the basic idea. And, um, uh, how did you operationalize that? Okay. So yes, so we basically, so we had a, we did a survey, uh, eh, eh, sort of a kind of representative national sample survey, uh, us only based in the U S, that's correct. Um, and uh, we had, so it was done in two waves. In the first wave we had about 1,400 respondents. And in the second wave, of course you always get is some attrition. I think there were 950 or something, um, that, you know, followed up with the second wave. And so what we did was we randomly assigned, we had four different groups and basically we randomly assigned them to get different numbers.

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We said, here, here's a list of ways you can help with climate change. It helped to, you know, prevent climate change. And we gave, depending on the group they were in, they got either one of these behaviors. Uh, so we, we randomly pulled behaviors from **a list of 25** that we had pre-tested, uh, on with the different set of people **asking them how difficult they thought these items**

were to do. Right. And so we had 25 of these items. Uh, we actually started 30, we dropped the very, the ones that were rated the very most difficult and the least difficult. Um, and um, and then we, we randomly assigned four groups. We gave, you know, one group, just one, one another group, **5 items from this list**, another group, **10 items from this list** and another group, **20 items from this list**. And you know, our hypothesis was that, uh, at least on the upper end of this number of, of items that you get, you, uh, we should start to see people feeling like they're less likely to make a difference or something.

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So we measured, so as far as suicide, so where there's two interests, two measures we're interested in. We had these two waves, right? So the first wave we measured, we asked them after we gave them this list of items, we asked them a couple of different questions that measure efficacy. Basically, how much do they think what they do makes a difference, right? So we had four different items basically for that, uh, four different things that they roughly get at that idea. And then, um, and then in the follow-up, **in the second wave, which was a week, roughly a week afterwards, uh, we asked them if they had actually done any of the behaviors that they were, uh, that they had been shown in this previous wave.** And we gave them the list. David actually had they done, right? Yes. What did they do? Yeah, exactly. So, and so again, of course, you know, uh, these are just self-reported measures, so we have no idea if they're truthfully reporting them or not.

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Um, but just taking them at face value. Uh, so what happened was, um, like I said before, you know, we, we, we pretested these difficulties, right? So the level of difficulty, right? And so, uh, it's the effect that we see is not as straight forward as we thought it would be. Um, we thought that just, well, at least once you get up to 20, people should feel less efficacious because like, Oh my God, I can do all this stuff. Oh my God, I can, do, I have to do all this stuff. Yeah, that's, that's, that's, that's what we thought. So it's a little bit more complicated than that. It does happen. **So whether you give them 1, 5 or 10 doesn't seem to matter.** They're basically, the effects is the same, **but 20 does matter.** But in a sort of complicated way, uh, that we still don't have a good handle on exactly why.

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So, uh, when you get *20 relatively easy items*, right, uh, you are less likely, you feel less efficacious and are, are, are actually perform fewer of these actions a week later or report is aligned with cognitive overload possibly easy thing. So, yeah, so bad you wouldn't do that easily. Yeah. Yes. So, but maybe, um, precisely because they're easy. So here's possibly what this might be, where the norms come in, but, but you know, again, this is, you should have speculative I guess, but so possibly so if you see items that, so a lot of these items are like turn off the lights when you leave a room, rents, dishes in cold water, things like that. So well in those, you know, were ones that were rated relatively easy. But then you think if I get 20 of these, they're *easy*. I really should do them all right.

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Should be in a normative term. Right. I really should. But man, that sounds like a lot to do. Right? So maybe I ended up just feel overwhelmed by the whole thing

now. And I guess if you have more difficult items you can sort of justify maybe not doing them better and also then maybe do them. Another aspect might be, so again, it's hard to say because you know, as far as where we're all of the research on this has done like in a consumer choice context. Yeah. So, so it's also possible that, um, but, but the, the meta, so there's a couple of meta analyses that have been done and look at, you know, so overall if you look at all these studies, it looks like there is no effective choice overload. Sort of at least these two meta analysis that we've looked at. Um, if you average across all of the studies they look at basically there's zero effect, but they do find that certain factors affect them. **And one of them is the ability to make tradeoffs, right? So it's easier to make tradeoffs at these items, then choice overload is less likely to happen**, right? And so I think maybe if you have some, uh, variance in the difficulty that differentiates them. And so then it, it, so then it's easier to make trade offs right off.

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How do you, how do you, how do you know which one? Something like this, I'm never going to draw a point, even though I don't have to choose only one. Yeah, I can choose all shirt or you could just choose one, but maybe they're not mutually exclusive. They aren't mutually exclusive. So that's the difference. So that's a big difference here between the consumer side of this research, which is that, you know, typically what they're looking at is you want to buy a product, how does the number of products you could potentially buy affect this, but you're still only going to buy one of them. You're not going to buy 12 different computers or something, or 12 different TVs to buy one TV, probably a, at least, at least in this current decision, right. I might be mr. So, but so it's not really, so it's unclear, I guess how the fact that these aren't mutually exclusive decisions that are potentially, you know, a cumulative decisions, right. That how that affects people's behavior because I literally think there's been no work done on that context.

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Fascinating though, because he think about the implications of that, right? It's, it's, it's not a mutually exclusive, so I'm not having to choose one over all these others and the component that you talked about before, right. That I'm going to have to make a choice based on here. I could actually do all of these. There's no research there. Yeah,

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sure. And you would think that in that sort of setting choice overload should be even stronger because then it's like you're, you're really overwhelmed with all of these choices because it's like one thing like, okay, uh, you know, I got all these 20 teeth, **4,000 TVs** I can choose from all just like eeny, meeny, miny, Moe or something. Right. And then forget about it

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is about scientific terms. They're very scientific. Once you get tenure you buy these [inaudible] it's very, very technical. A procedure.

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But so, so yeah, sorry, now I lost my train of thought cause I was trying to make a joke when you have many things in like maybe uh, yeah I don't know. Maybe you think, Oh you really sweat over. Like should I do all of them? Like even like

trying to whittle down, which you should do I think becomes a task in and of itself, right? Even to think like, well cause first you have to make the decision I guess before you decide which to do, how much effort am I going to put into this whole thing? Right. And so then, then I think that might be where, you know, the having variation in the difficulty of them might help because then it gives you something to sort of differentiate these things and kind of whittled down this thing and make sense of this big mass of kind of choices that confront you.

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So that's going back to the original hypothesis on this though, right? Of looking at this and saying, yeah, there is this, this cognitive overload that happens. And yet what you found at least from this one study was that really doesn't play an impact on this. So, so the implications of that for at least from this climate change in saying, here's a list of things that you can do [inaudible] I mean, the implications are it doesn't really matter then how big that list is. Yeah. To a certain degree, a certain degree, right. But now there's some aspects that NABI, right. So, but maybe that it's important again, you know, we need more than one study on this. Yeah. So you know, if there's any potential funders listening, they should of course fund further studies.

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Yeah. Contact you, contact you direct. Yes, exactly. Rubin backline@stonybrook.edu there'll be in the show notes.

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Yeah. So, um, but uh, but yeah, so it's possible that, you know, maybe when it, if you know organizations or, or governments or whatever interested in sort of fomenting this kind of, uh, prosocial behavior that perhaps they do need to make these lists, even if they make them long, make them varied. So differential and then possibly, you know, because maybe certain types of actors appeal to certain types of different people. Right.

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So riding, riding a bike instead of driving. Yes. Particularly in Minnesota where Tim and I live throughout the entire year, it's a little bit harder. Yeah. People do it, you know, you live in San Diego a little easier, but to that component, having that work versus washing dishes in cold water, those are two very different effects of, of difficulty doing. So showing that difficulty in having that trade off for that would be an interesting component to really think about. So I know some of our listeners are really big climate activists. Okay.

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And they might want to know of this list. Are there things that sort of make the most sense or have the greatest impact? You talked about difficulty, but what about impact? Uh, right. So, uh, I don't have, I don't know. I should know which ones. Damn. I hate, I hate the *stump the professor* [inaudible] kind of stuff. It's just that I, I should, uh, yeah. Uh, um, so presumably there were probably ones that were more likely to be performed or reported having been done. I don't know what those are. Okay. But you've got the data. Yeah. I just, we haven't looked at it yet, but I will look into that cause that's, yeah, that's an important thing. So straight. Yeah. I think perhaps from this, I mean, you would think like, you know, certainly before I had done this research, I would have, if you asked

me like, well, what kind of, if you wanted to provide someone to list like this, what kind of lists should you give them?

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I would have said, give them a list of easy stuff to do. Right. Uh, but apparently that would have been the wrong answer, right? Yeah. I don't know. So very possibly, yes. Possibly might be the conclusion. Yeah, yeah, yeah, yeah. So, and there is this, you know, again, there's this finding, I think in both of these med analyses that, you know, the ability to sort of make these tradeoffs among them helps in, in reducing the, the choice overload. Right? And so, yes, no, no, go ahead. Yeah.

So how does this fit into the department of political science? He's doing a question.

Yeah, that's a very good question. They asked my that's the same one. No, so like I said, so Stonybrook, um, so Stonybrook has a, uh, an unusual, uh, political science department, uh, that's heavily experimental. Uh, so about, we have about 20 faculty members and probably 15 of them do some kind of experiments in their research.

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Right. So, um, so Sunnybrook has been historically a sort of in the Vanguard of the political psychology movement. We had some of the sort of, uh, Shanto ion Gar and some of the founders of mill lodge of the political psychology, uh, that started at Sunnybrook. Actually, Milt lodge is still, it's Tony Burkey's America's, but he's still in the office every day. Uh, Shanto, you know, moved to Stanford or maybe somewhere in between, but, um, but so we've had this sort of reputation as being very good at political psychology. And then at some point in the middle, about 10 years ago, we lost most of the political economy. People that, uh, were in the department and, uh, they were more traditional kinds of political economy people. And they started, uh, then the, the department said, well, let's try to rebuild our political economy program in a way that complements our sort of traditional strength and political psychology.

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So let's do this thing that we're going to call behavioral political economy. So you sort of, you know, I mean, I don't think we coined that term, but you know, we said, okay, we'll call it, we'll call it that. And so then we started hiring people that do, uh, I was, I guess probably the first person that was intentionally hired with this goal in mind, uh, to start doing kind of more politically relevant, basically behavioral and experimental economics. Very, very cool.

So you, you talked about your, your research, just in general, what are some of the other kind of big trends that you've been working on?

So a lot of what I do is, um, is laboratory experiments, uh, sort of eh, on **cooperation**, but framed in a way, uh, in, uh, in a climate change sort of way. So there's a sort of standard paradigm that's used now per standard game that's called the collective risk social dilemma, not the most marketable name.

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So we call it the **disaster game**, cause it's actually a better way better man for Molinsky is the guy who came up with this, who's is very remarkable guy, but you know, sort of that sort of the academic obvious academic thing to call it. So, so the idea with this game is, so it's a public goods game, but, uh, so everybody's trying to work at a common purpose. But of course, like any public goods game, there's a, you know, a sort of, some incentive to free ride. The difference here is that, so, uh, so you have a group of four, so you do it in group of four people. **You give them each 100 bucks and you say, we don't give him that much money cause we can't pay them that much. So let's just say a hundred bucks, a round number. It's 100 bucks. So that means the group has \$400 and let's say the group has two.**

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Uh, so then we say all right, as a, as a group, you need to contribute \$200. So half of the amount that you have basically, uh, to uh, a fond a threshold, right? So, and if you contribute this \$200, at least \$200 as a group, then you save the rest of the money that you have, right? If you don't, you stand some chance, high probability of losing it all. So that's where the does that. So it's supposed to model sort of catastrophic climate change, but it can model any sort of disaster, right? So we've also framed it in terms of like a town trying to build a levy or something cause the flood is coming or whatever. So don't get enough money to buy the levy, then you're all going to die or be flooded or whatever. And if you do, then you save what you got left.

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Right? So of course there's still this free riding incentive because I would prefer the, you pay the money to meet the threshold as opposed to me because then I'm even better off. **But if nobody pays anything, then we all lose everything or have a high probability of losing everything or anything.** So lately we've been trying to apply this to, uh, things like, um, eh, sort of new technologies in, um, uh, climate mitigation and other things that don't actually exist yet. And so it's hard to study them. And so we think that can justify studying the lab because, you know, one thing that's nice about sort of laboratory economics experiments is that you can create this artificial world. And so it, the bad thing is it's artificial and many people like to, you know, harp on that idea, you know, that does have some limitations. But the good thing is, is that you can create the world and you know exactly how that world works.

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Yes. Right now there's always a problem of whether the way that you say the world works is how the P the participants understand it. Uh, and not, there's some disconnect there often, but you know, you try to deal with that. So, so we think like, we're trying to argue that, um, you know, these types of laboratory experience are especially useful in this, in this context because these are worlds that actually don't yet exist, but we can create them, but, or at least create their, recreate their strategic feature where the future of these future. Exactly. And so the, the intergovernmental panel on climate change, you know, they produce these dire reports every year, blah, blah, blah, you know, terrible. And, but increasingly they've said, you know, we've waited so long to do sort of traditional mitigation that we're almost certainly going to need to do something

more radical like carbon capture and storage or geoengineering or something like that.

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Uh, in order along with traditional mitigation stuff in order to actually do, you know, prevent disasters, climate change. And so we have paper that we recently published where we did this basic disaster game, but instead of just like having a simple contribution where you can do a \$1 and that will get you \$1 throws closer to meeting this threshold, we gave them two contribution options. One that standard one, \$1 gets you \$1 closer and another sort of risky option where \$1 might get you, gives you 50% chance of getting \$2 closer and 50% chance of getting \$0 million closer. So it's like investing in some risky technology that you don't know if it's going to work. It might pay off big time. My pay off, not at all. Right. And so, and then when we did was we manipulated the, the size of the threshold. So at some point it's the threshold gets big enough.

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You, there's no way you can meet it through traditional contributions. So some people have to gamble, right? But then it's a coordination problem, sort of like who's going to do the gambling, right. Who in this group? Yeah, exactly. A group of four or six, we usually do forges cause cheaper. The original ones were down to six or whatever. But yeah, I mean there's not, yeah, exactly. Exactly. Yeah. So we try to be cheaper if we can. Uh, and so, and yeah, and so what we do find is that, I mean, sort of optimistically is that, uh, as the threshold does get bigger, as people need to make these gambles, they understand they need to, and we do see more of this behavior. It's fairly more cooperative. Yeah, exactly. And more and not just more, and it's, and the funny thing is it's not that people are, you know, not, so they're, they're making the tradeoff between.

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So some people of course never contributed anything. Uh, but like mostly people are just switching their con, which way? The contribution either with the sure thing with the risky one in a very rational kind of way. They're still making the country. Yeah. And they're doing when they need to make the risk of your contributions. We see a lot more of that. So it's actually optimists. So one of the, one of the funny things about doing these kinds of games. So we've done a lot of these disaster, various versions of this disaster game and you see a lot more cooperation than you would expect. So that's somewhat optimistic except we wonder, you know, again, since this is artificial and people know it's pretty funny. So like doing, um, so you know, we've run a lot of these social, especially if you do them on, on mechanical Turk online, right?

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And you're talking about climate change thing, you get all kinds of comments about things, right? Including people saying that, Oh, you know, you're just in the pocket. You know, you're just doing this cause you get all this money for, you know, studying climate change. I don't know who's getting all this money. It's not me anyway, but you get all these places, comments. But what you see is that even these people who are climate deniers, so there's really great graduate students, she tracks like, you know, cause we let them do open ended comments at the end. She likes, you know, codes people as kind of climate deniers or whatever to see if they act differently. They don't actually. So they

say like, yes I contributed, but just because I wanted to make money again, I understood the game. But I think climate change is a bunch of nonsense or something.

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Right? But in this context, you know, cause we frame these, we tell them that it's like, you imagine this is a climate change scenario or something. Right. But so they're willing to sort of put this aside for the purposes of this, uh, you know, experiment sort of, even if they're like, well, you know, we know that you're just some liberal, you know, political scientist who loves climate or wants to stop climate change, but we think it's a hoax. Right? But we're still gonna play along cause we want to make money. So, I dunno what the insight there is, maybe that, you know, gotta make people put their money where their mouth is, right. And then maybe you push comes to shove, they'll, I don't know. But anyway, so it's kind of interesting to have that presence of free writers. I'm always curious if economic perspective, um, courage and I've done a lot of work in incentives.

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Yeah, sure. And so I'm always curious about the presence of free-riders in a situation like this. It's pretty consistent of game to game. Like does it vary significantly by the rules or the, it does tend to vary I guess so sure you'll get, um, yeah, so it varies a lot. I guess where it probably varies the most is whether do you sort of one shot games. So were you just making one decision or you know, the original ones using this disaster game, uh, from Molinsky and these guys [inaudible] and some of the ones that we've done, you do over multiple rounds, right? To use like many contribution decisions. So there you typically see less, uh, so free writing because there's the, the shadow of the future or whatever that you, you know, you want to cause and there's conditional cooperation. So you see, so, but, but then one thing you see in those that there's, there's often quite a divergence in terms of groups based on the initial contributions, right?

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So, so if a group happened, just happens that somebody wants to contribute initially that's very good for increase like long, long term cooperation. Whereas if for whatever reason people start off on the wrong foot, it's really hard to recover from those initial States. They really true States and conditional cooperation is very important. Uh, you know, also in terms of climate change, there's a lot of public opinion research that if you ask people like in an international context, right. Uh, okay, so how, what sort of, you know, uh, international treaties or whatever you would support? There's always a strong component of, well, we're happy to have, uh, our country do stuff as long as other countries are doing strong. Right? So like there's this very strong like sort of moral idea or ethical idea of like conditional cooperation, fairness, equity. Exactly. And that's a huge issue. Equity, you know, because of the historical responsibility for climate change and all that kind of stuff. Very, very complicated. Yeah. Yeah. People think about that. Going back to the free rider component,

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do you [inaudible] these in, in the, these games, do people know what other people have contributed? So do they understand that Tim is the free rider and I

am the one who is putting in lots and lots of my money for the course. That would good. That would not be the case. You would be the free writer. Yes, that is true.

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So yeah, so we don't typically, I think this is pretty standard. So one you don't want. So like the, the fact that you guys know each other or the fact that you can even see each other or whatever might create some noise. So typically we do it like, so people come into the lab, you know, they're in dividers, so they sit in the computer and they can't see next to them. But they still see each other. But the groups are anonymous. But you do know you can sort of track players because like you know after every week if you do it like you know multiple rounds, then you'll have a screen or at least the way we do it I think is pretty common. You have a screen that says, okay player one contributed this player two contributed that so you can lose track, you know? Well player two is the free rider or whatever. Right.

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So since it's a limited, there's not the face to face component in it, but you do know maybe.

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Right? I mean the problem is you don't want like them to beat each other up after they leave the lab or something. It's like wow you were, I saw you 10 bucks or something. Yeah. Well the people in Turkey is hot as anything. It's that people get can get really worked up over small stakes. Cause I've had people call me things I've never even heard of because I didn't pay them 5,630 or something. I in Turkey. Yeah.

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Wow. That's a fascinating component in and of itself. There's a whole other research. Well that, I mean, it's fascinating to me, again, with your first study, kind of looking at, you know, uh, cognitive overload along with this, this cooperation component and all these factors. So do you hold out hope? Uh, this is the question. I mean, if climate change is kind of this component that's coming down the line with the research and what you've seen, you know, are you holding out hope that there is a possibility that we'll cooperate and be able to make a difference? So,

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right. So that's, it's a really good question. I, so, you know, I always tell people that like, uh, you know, I study climate change for living, so I'm, you know, always depressed. But that's so, I don't know. So of course, what's actually happening in terms of like international action is, is not very comforting. Okay. But actually, I think the fact that I've done all of these studies makes me more optimistic rather than less, because like I said, we at least in these disaster games, and again, the question is always like the external validity. Right? Like, how does this, what we do in this artificial environment, the lab, you know, apply to the real world. But if it does apply at all, then people are actually more cooperative than you would expect. So. Yeah. So there's reason to be hopeful, I think. So if the results would have been the alternate.

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Yeah, exactly. Yeah. Yeah, yeah. Uh, so it's, you know, it's complicated. I do think so. You know, apart from my own research and stuff, I, I'm becoming more optimistic just because I seem more and more likely that there will be technological solutions which won't require sort of widespread behavioral change. Right. But I mean, so much better if we just didn't have to change a damn thing. Exactly. It'd be a lot easier. But one interesting thing is, so that's actually another thing that we're, we haven't done the research yet, but we're working on a design, right. Using this disaster game, but to look at, so people are, so lot of times people talk about, uh, geoengineering, right? And when they talk about geo engineer, there's different kinds, but mostly it's like solar radiation management where somehow you try to put some kind of chemicals like juice or some kind of sulfur compounds in the atmosphere to like reflect back more of the sun's rays, right?

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So it's not as, so it's like an inverted greenhouse effect or whatever. Like reducing, okay. So, so in theory, some of these things work, they've never really been, you know, applied, uh, on a grand scale. So we don't really know. But one concern that people have is that actually even if they work, they might convince people that they work too well. And as the IPCC says, intergovernmental panel on climate change, right? They say that even if we do this kind of stuff, we still need to do the traditional mitigation stuff too. But what people are worried about is, you know, what they talk about in insurance markets, like the moral hazard, right? So now that we've got this insurance against climate change and this magic bullet, I can, you know, go whatever and drive my Ferrari around everywhere or whatever. Right? So like people are worried about this hurt.

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Yeah, yeah, yeah. I'm sure he's got a number of Ferrari's. Uh, uh, but so yeah, so, so that's a really interesting question there. And again, I think it's a question that we need to, before we start to implement these you engineering schemes, we need to know something about these behavioral responses to them. And so this is a plug for my type of research, right? We can sort of, I mean, even if we don't understand the exact, uh, geoengineering scheme that's going to be implemented, there's sort of strategic aspects we can model. We can abstract into a laboratory experiment and get some idea of how people might behave under these circumstances. Right? You think about the unintended consequences of many, many different things and it's understanding that that behavioral aspect of what these, the behaviors that

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whatever the implementation is drives. Because sometimes we go, Oh, geo engineering, great. Then we don't have to. But if it results in the fact that, wow, now I can drive my SUV twice as much and I can, you know, use water in, you know, all my clothes or whatever it would be the small little things, but they're not mitigating those other factors, then the result is the same or even potentially worse. Yeah.

[30:08](#)

Uh, I'd like to turn over to music if that's okay. Sure. Uh, before we do, I just have to acknowledge that I think this is the very first time in the nearly 100 episodes that I said something to Kurt and he was actually speechless and

coming back. So I just wanted to make a note of that. So record Reuben, you're own if you're part of history. Right. Wow, I am, I am very happy to hear that. So let's talk about music. A, you are a big focus

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guy. I do. I like a lot of funky, especially so, you know, of course I like the classic ones, like the P-Funk, uh, you know, or all of the different names that part of the man, it's all the different names of bands that George Clinton had. 400, whatever, hundreds of those words. Uh, and also, you know, sliding the family stones and the, those guys. But, uh, you know, there's some newer sort of, I don't know if they call it Neo funk or Neo soul or new, I don't know, whatever they call it. Uh, so there's these guys that black Pumas I really like. Uh, they just came out with some stuff. There's also sort of more like a kind of instrumental funk bands, like the new master sounds and the bamboos and stuff. Uh, I guess we're not entirely instrumental, but largely instrumental. It's like this old fool kind of funk, kind of funk jazz or something, I guess.

[31:24](#)

Uh, so yeah, I like that kind of stuff.

Um, what got you interested in that?

I don't know. I don't know. It's a good question. I honestly don't know. I mean, I, I, you know, when I grew up, uh, growing up, like in high school and stuff, I mostly listened to like classic rock and stuff that come from like a rural Ohio. So that's the kind of stuff. It's either that or country, so, and so, but then my, I don't know, my tastes have evolved a lot and I, I dunno, I like most different kinds of music. Uh, you know, there's not any kind of genre that I totally issue, I guess. Um, uh, you know, the modern country I don't like so much, but you know, a lot of the classic country **Willie Nelson** or **Johnny Cash** that,

[32:06](#)

yeah, **Hank Williams**. That's terrific stuff. Um, but yeah, I really like, you know, all kinds of music. So like, I didn't know, I just think it's amazing to kind of grow up in a classic rock world, uh, and then actually say, well, I think the stuff that I really want to listen to now is going to be not just sliding the family stone, but the Bamboo's. You know, I was just like, wow.

[32:29](#)

I mean, I still listen to **Led Zeppelin** and stuff and I love led Zeppelin and that and the **Rolling Stones**, whatever. But yeah, I mean my,

[32:36](#)

do you always have broad? Yeah. Do you use music to prime you or do you use music in different ways for different events or you know, his ways to celebrate or relax or,

[32:46](#)

yeah, yeah. All of those things. Yeah. I use it to relax for plans. Yeah. I got different playlists, I got to work, play lists, which is, you know, mostly instrumental stuff because I have a hard time tuning out the lyrics. Uh, same as me. Um, eh, and especially if it's song, I mean sometimes if I really know the song, it's sort of like going on in my head, but it doesn't like, I guess since it's so

ingrained in my head, it doesn't affect my other processing capabilities or something. But typically I try to do like instrumental stuff, so I don't get like a low key energy or it depends. So another thing I really love is Afrobeat, you know, Fela Kuti, right? Uh, so that's pretty high energy and it's not only instrumental, but a lot of it's instrumental and oftentimes he's singing in his native language or whatever, some kind of pigeon. He goes, I don't understand any of the words anyway, so it doesn't really distract us another musical and listen to one song and it's like, you know, 25 minutes long or something. So get you through a lot. All of his songs.

[33:46](#)

I'm a big fan of a Portuguese folk music for that reason because I know I don't speak Portuguese, but the stuff is just super cool and, and they'll, they'll play songs for 10 minutes. I don't know anything about Portuguese folk music. Is it at all related to the kind of the Brazilian music that we know about? No, Brazilian is way more Afro. Sure. Of course. You know, it's just more a, it's just got more native, uh, European style instruments. So it's much less purposive. It's more melodic. There's something like a flamenco version. Exactly. All those kinds of things. Yeah, that's a good way of thinking about it is very similar to the Spanish stuff. All that Iberian peninsula stuff is kind of all similar, but they were also influenced by the Gale, the gales from sure. Because they came down like in a, in a from Ireland [inaudible] weird cross-cultural thing going with fiddles and uh, and uh, uh, God, you know, all those kinds of countries. Yeah. So it's very quick. Tim's making a hand motion to, to indicate some sort of installed [inaudible]

[34:53](#)

ah, so then like in then in Galicia or something. Yeah. Cause there's a big Gaelic influence in Galicia, right? Which is that sort of little place that's in Spain, but they speak some weird language that's a version of Portuguese and Spanish moves together. Yeah, exactly. That's it. Exactly. Yeah. Huh. Okay. That's fine. Well Ruben, thank you so much.

[35:12](#)

Thank you for your time. And would you look forward to hearing more about some of the stuff and I'm glad to hear it. Especially all of the veins of research that are going to come off of this current stuff.

[35:23](#)

Yeah. Yeah. We're this, this stuff is in the early stages. So we hope to do some more stuff cause there's something there. We think we've just got to figure out what it is. Yeah. All right. Terrific. Thank you so much, Isaiah. Thank you very much. Great. That was awesome. Thank you. Yeah, cool.